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Abstract
Both geographically and historically, schizophrenia may have emerged from a psychosis
that was more florid, affective, labile, shorter lived and with a better prognosis. It is
conjectured that this has occurred with a reflexive self-consciousness in Western and
globalising societies, a development whose roots lie in Christianity. Every theology also
presents a psychology. Six novel aspects of Christianity may be significant for the emer-
gence of schizophrenia—an omniscient deity, a decontexualised self, ambiguous agency,
a downplaying of immediate sensory data, and a scrutiny of the self and its reconstitu-
tion in conversion.
Keywords
Christianity, conversion, indigenous psychology, proprioception, proto-schizophrenia,
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Paul, you are beside yourself, too much study is sending you mad.
(Acts 26.24)
This paper proposes that schizophrenia has not been universal, either culturally or
historically, but that nevertheless its current near ubiquity would argue for some
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approximately universal predisposition. This we would seek in Christian monothe-
ism’s reﬂexive consciousness and in its later secular successors. We have previously
argued that the possibilities of religion and of psychosis have evolved together,
through a common evolutionary trajectory (Dein & Littlewood, 2011),1 but what in
modern times and Westernised societies has got us from the human possibility of
schizophrenia (“proto-schizophrenia”) to frank schizophrenia?
Before considering evidence for the nonuniversality of schizophrenia, we have to
bear in mind that any attempt to search for the illness beyond its current perspec-
tive leads to the obvious objection that overt schizophrenic symptoms, though
present elsewhere, may be apparent only within an already modern and
Westernised perspective. Thus when C.G. Seligman, a physician and anthropolo-
gist, argued that severe mental illness was unknown in early contact New Guinea
except in situations of considerable Westernisation (Seligman, 1929), he was criti-
cised by anthropologists for ignoring psychosis which might be “concealed” in
local patterns of ritual performance (apart from the likelihood that any cases
of severe mental illness which came to colonial medical attention were only
likely to be already in a situation of considerable contact and dominance by the
Europeans—and thus “contact” was oversalient). Similar objections make the
popular argument that shamanism or possession ritual conceals or “compensates”
schizophrenia (cf. Fabrega, 1982).
Fabrega has argued in a caveat that the “ﬁrst rank symptoms” of schizophrenia,
taken in modern comparative psychiatry as an accurate manifestation of unequivo-
cal schizophrenia, really necessitate “basic Western assumptions about human
action and social reality,” particularly cultural conventions of the autonomous
self (Fabrega, 1982, p. 56). He cites such conventions that persons are independent
beings whose minds and bodies are separated from each other and function
autonomously; that under ordinary conditions external inﬂuences do not aﬀect
an individual; that thoughts are recurring inner happenings that the self “has”;
that thoughts and feelings are rather diﬀerent things but that both are silent and
private; that one’s body is independent of what one feels or thinks; and that body
and feelings have a purely naturalistic basis and cannot be modiﬁed by external
suprahuman agents (Fabrega, 1982). Barrett (2004), ﬁnding the Iban of Borneo
have diﬃculty understanding his questions about two ﬁrst rank symptoms, thought
insertion and thought broadcasting, argues in a related way. His three Iban indi-
viduals (contrasted with 39 European Australians in a matched psychotic sample)
who experience these symptoms are all converts to Christianity. He suggests an
association with education and reading, and a familiarity with the idea of an
omniscient God who can tell what is in one’s mind. (But equal numbers of Iban
and Australians experienced auditory hallucinations.) Traditional Iban notions of
thinking, he proposes, are much more embodied, tied closely to emotion, will, and
desire: their word for “thought” also denotes “speech.”
Given the absence of any objective measures of the psychobiology of “proto-
schizophrenia,” are we then compelled to go round in circles when considering the
universality of schizophrenia in other societies and historical epochs? In this paper,
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we propose a fairly broad perspective of what the “eventual” symptoms of schizo-
phrenia might be, taking into account the apparent overlap with other patterns
such as mania or delirium: and thus in intention at any rate avoiding the category
mistake of assuming that all the manifestations of schizophrenia are and have been
universal. Nevertheless, past commentators have inevitably made judgements in
relation to their own categories of illness, and putting their own conclusions
together can never be fully persuasive: we have to move in and out of presumed
uniformity and less certain family resemblances.
Cultural variation
The idea that Westernisation resulted in a higher incidence of schizophrenia was
common in the 19th and 20th centuries and was discussed by Kraepelin in 1919/
1971. In 1810 Richard Powell had noted insanity was “considerably on the
increase” whilst Andrew Halliday (1828) wrote “we seldom meet with insanity
among the savage races of men; not one of our African travellers remark
their having seen a single madman” (as cited in Hunter & Macalpine, 1963,
pp. 821–822). We can take these comments with a degree of caution. Not only
colonial prejudice and Victorian anxieties: the travellers were hardly looking for
mental illness, nor were the early modern doctors attempting to methodically
search out and register all insane people in any community. Imperial psychiatrists
in Africa like Tooth and Carothers (as, more recently, Lopez in Brazil, Beaglehole
in Hawaii, and Dhunjibhoy in India) later commented on the infrequency of schizo-
phrenia among communities relatively untouched by colonialism or Westernisation
(as reviewed by Torrey in 1979) but on the high frequency of toxic, confusional, or
organic symptoms found in apparent schizophrenia (the primary illnesses here may
of course have been an infection), but we have to be aware of their fairly prejudicial
colonial mindset. Yet the Nigerian psychiatrist Adeoye Lambo (1965) agrees that
schizophrenia among nonliterate Yoruba is less likely to be associated with sys-
tematised chronic delusions and is more confusional, anxious, transitory, and
aﬀective, whilst urban Yoruba have the same pattern of schizophrenia as educated
modern Europeans.
It is perhaps better to rely on anthropologists (taking into account the local
concepts of personhood and illness) who draw rather similar conclusions.
Ackernecht (1943) cites some early ﬁeld studies. In Ghana, Field (1960) however
argues the association between education and schizophrenia is simply that the
former makes the illness more visible, but Fortes in 1969 in a diﬀerent and more
administratively remote area, argues rather diﬀerently. He carried out his initial
ﬁeldwork among the Tallensi of northern Ghana in the 1930s, and then revisited
them with his wife, a doctor and medical psychologist, in the 1960s. The Tallensi
recognised a chronic pattern called galuk characterised by unintelligibility, con-
fused, and erratic behaviour, an incapacity to carry out normal social and product-
ive tasks, yet clearly distinguished from eccentricity or “other forms of
abnormality.” Among the local population of around 5,000, Fortes identiﬁed in
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the 1930s only one instance of galuk amidst plenty of eccentrics, mentally handi-
capped, and senile individuals. He thinks there were no others and that early death
or social concealment by the generally tolerant Tallensi were unlikely. By contrast,
among the same villages in the 1960s, with local missionisation and some primary
education, Fortes and Mayer ﬁnd 13 cases, and more in neighbouring areas: “I had
to refuse to see any more. . .” (1969, p. 53). Most of the 13 had previously worked in
urban Southern Ghana for a period, either as domestic servants or unskilled
labourers.
Firth (1973, p. 224), without citing speciﬁc instances, maintains that nonindus-
trial societies are more tolerant of the symbolisations of mental illness and are more
likely to enter into a successful dialogue with them. Reviewing data from Ireland
and Istria, Murphy (1982, p. 70) argues high rates of schizophrenia occur in situ-
ations of “conﬂicting or unduly complex demands”; considering the low rates
among Tongans and Taiwanese, he speculates that their culture is less individual-
istic. Devereux proposes schizophrenia as a psychose ethnique, a product of violent
processes of acculturation and oppression (Devereux, 1970, p. 248), and identiﬁes
as causal psychological detachment and fragmented or specialised lives amongst
other factors. Communities in the early stages of Westernisation are less common
now, but the World Health Organisation’s various studies on schizophrenia have
found in developing countries a lesser incidence, better prognosis, shorter episodes,
and a more aﬀective presentation (Hopper, 2008). Leﬀ (1981, p. 156) argues that
the relationship of schizophrenia to the acute transient psychoses of the sort com-
monly described in the Third World (the bouﬀe´es de´lirantes of Franco-Cuban
psychiatry: Littlewood & Lipsedge, 1981) “remains unsolved.” Working from con-
temporary Western symptoms, he argues that there has been a shift from bodily to
psychological modes of expression; thus the bodily equivalents of delusions of
control are the symptoms of catatonia (waxy ﬂexibility, mitgehen, echopraxia,
and echolalia) more common in developing and rural societies. Jablensky (1987)
argues that schizophrenia is more severe and chronic in modernised societies and
with industrialisation (similarly Cooper and Sartorius [1977] who favour aspects of
social response); Hopper (2008) provides a critical review of such “culture”
explanations.
Historical variation
Early Babylonian, Egyptian, Hebrew, and Indian texts refer to what we may take
as insanity: “impulsive, uncontrolled and unreasonable behaviour” (Rosen, 1968,
p. 32; also B. Clarke, 1975) but not in any systematic way; there is simply a general
recognition of irrational behaviour along with a demonological explanation.
Ideally the term used for this by physicians or other experts in earlier eras
should be supplemented by popular lay perceptions (Macdonald, 1987) and by
detailed biographical descriptions (Macdonald, 1987), but the early experts did
not amplify their diagnoses with the sort of description we need. Without such
evidence we cannot easily accept such statements as this by Zilborg (1941, p. 45)
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about the classical Greeks: “There were certain mental disturbances, obvious even
to the lay person of our day, which continued to remain unrecognised.” Were
Socrates’s “voices” really schizophrenia (1941, p. 41)? How can we know?
It appears likely that the Greeks did not clearly distinguish “madness” (an0a,
aino"nous) as psychosis from “delirium” (par0noia, par0’ron"onous). The
Hippocratic corpus (1923/1981, pp. 140, 174) often places the two together and
uses both to refer to something in the course of a fever. There is no word for, or
description of, chronic psychosis here unless this was subsumed into acute madness
or delirium, and both Simon (1978) and Evans, McGrath, and Milns (2003) state
there is no mention of anything like schizophrenia in Greece, and that an0a
(mania) simply connotes “frenzy.” Madness in myth, epic, and tragedy relies on
extremes of passion (Padel, 1981), with associated temporary illusions (mistaken
perceptions; Rosen, 1968, Chapter 3). However, there is some idea of chronic
madness in tragedy (Padel, 1981), and Jeste, Del Carmen, Lohr, and Wyatt
(1985) argue that these are historical descriptions of something like schizophrenia
but that the symptoms have changed over time, whilst Devereux (1970, p. 274)
conﬁdently identiﬁes an increase during the decline of Rome. Certainly something
happens here. It is in the later Roman period that Philo recounts an actual case of a
quiet and chronic madman (Rosen, 1968) as does Aretaeus (Zilborg, 1941, p. 77),
and Galen and Soranus, in the early Christian era, both note that mania then
occurred without fever (Diethelm, 1971); by the ﬁrst century C. E. Celsus refers
to a “third type” of insanity, characterised by false images or disordered judgement
(as cited in Jeste et al., 1985) but it was often associated with inappropriate laughter
and “foolish amuse[ment]” and thus might correspond to modern mania
(Evans et al., 2003).
Like Diethelm, Hunter and Macalpine (1963), in their selection of early
modern and modern texts in British psychiatry, easily tag past descriptions
with a label of “schizophrenia” but it seems wiser to refer to accounts where
we have some more detailed contemporary description of the patients. And here
we have a long gap between Hippocrates and Galen and the 17th-century English
divine and astrologer, Richard Napier, who kept modestly detailed records and
clinical descriptions of his patients. Napier (or, rather, his biographer who exam-
ined the casebooks statistically) ﬁnds a higher than expected proportion of young
adults among those severely mentally disturbed, an association with villages with
a transient population and those with a higher than average proportion of
Puritans and Catholics (both presumably more religiously observant than mod-
erate Anglicans; Macdonald, 1981, pp. 40, 61, 68–69). His “most ﬂamboyant and
recognisable kinds of insanity” (madness, lunacy, and distraction) are compara-
tively rare and account for 5% of consultations: they are characterised by inco-
herent speech and unpredictable suicides, by aimless wandering, sudden changes
of mood, assaults, self-mutilation, and the destruction of others’ and their own
property. These are all distinguished from melancholia and from what we would
now term situational and neurotic complaints. Macdonald notes that it was only
later that Locke’s emphasis on cognition and perception was to place delusions in
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madness rather than, as previously, in melancholy (thus suggesting that Napier
might have underemphasised the amount of insanity by placing it under
melancholia).2
Going back to less detailed accounts, the Anglo-Saxon literature now mentions
instances of chronic insanity such as a four-year history (B. Clarke, 1975, p. 42) but
those recorded are miraculous cures and hence presumably cases with a good
prognosis. Cognitive changes are sometimes noted: “his powers of speech, discus-
sion and understanding failed him utterly” (B. Clarke, 1975, p. 42). De Gordon in
the 14th century mentions talking to oneself, failure to ﬁnish sentences or explain
them, meaningless remarks and aimless wandering, aﬀective lability and attempts
to grasp the impossible and irrational with poor judgement (as cited in B. Clarke,
1975, p. 97). Clarke describes at length the case of the English King Henry VI:
prudish, passive, religiously obsessed, and habitually dressed in black, at the age
31 he had an illness recalling catatonia which lasted for 6 months, plus two
relapses, some one and a half years in all.3
B. Clarke (1975) favours such biographical data when we can get it, to avoid
the emphasis on the obviously acute and frenzied cases which in the medieval
period and later were dealt with by immediate physical restriction rather than
observation. By the 16th century chronic madmen or their imitators (Tom
O’Bedlams) were commonly seen around Britain (B. Clarke, 1975, Chapter 9).
Thomas Willis in his Soul of Brutes (1674) said there was no need to give any
illustrations but notes their “incongruous notions” (as cited in B. Clarke, 1975,
p. 294; and Hunter & Macalpine 1963, p. 191): the pattern of severe mental
illness was apparently well known. Lunacy (Latin insania, furor; Greek mania)
now was generally distinguished from phrenyse which occurred only with a fever
(B. Clarke, 1975, p. 259) but there was little psychological description: simply
“like a wylde beast” (as cited in Hunter & Macalpine, 1963, p. 14). By the 19th
century, it was common to remark psychological symptoms like “loss of aﬀect”
and detachment from surroundings (Hunter & Macalpine, 1963, pp. 879–880),
and social and cultural explanations had appeared. Already in the 17th century,
religious enthusiasm had been said to lead to insanity, and in the early 19th
century it was recognised that there had been an increase in incidence in
Western Europe, especially in the towns rather than the countryside, and espe-
cially in England (1963, pp. 823–841),4 although doubts were raised about select-
ive bias in the statistics. In 1837, rates of insanity were approximately 1 in 1,000
in Europe (Scotland 1 in 574) as opposed to 1 in 262 in the United States in a
survey that took into account bias and data selection. That until the 1700s delu-
sions seem to have been included as melancholic rather than manic symptoms
(Macdonald, 1981, Chapter 4), and that it was the ﬂorid and antisocial patterns
which naturally came more readily to public notice may however of course both
argue that recognition of schizophrenia or proto-schizophrenia was likely to
have been reduced in the earlier period, to increase in the modern era when
both facilities and diagnostic patterns resemble more closely our current
procedures.
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Reflexive self-consciousness and modernity
Nevertheless, we are left with some evidence that the transition to Western
European modernity, both historically and culturally,5 has been associated with
a pattern of psychosis which, compared with its predecessors, is less “aﬀective,” less
ﬂorid and confused, which is associated with lasting cognitive changes such as
delusions, and is more chronic with a worse prognosis: in short, something resem-
bling our current idea of schizophrenia. Among the cultural changes that have
accompanied this, observers have attributed a variety of not unrelated patterns—
“social change” in general, traumatic social change, urbanisation, industrialisation,
modern education, literacy, Christianisation, individualism—and conscious self
awareness. Most medical interest has focused on the social response to psychosis:
here we want to emphasise by contrast the psychological schemata in a society
which might propel proto-schizophrenia into schizophrenia. Now schizophrenia is
usually thought of primarily as a biological pattern, so how might “soft” social and
cultural changes aﬀect the core symptoms (as opposed to altering prognosis
through social responses like stigmatisation)? Jenkins (2004) suggests that it is
the individual’s subjective attribution of the proto-symptoms (an attribution
located in culture) which aﬀects the eventual manifestation of the symptoms
themselves—which are thus as cultural as they are biological. Given rather indivi-
dualised and psychological thinking, the proto-voices6 have now to be externally
located in another person (Morrison, 1999), to which we might add the obvious
objection that psychopathologies (just like “normal functioning”) are a product of
both biology and culture.
In this paper we focus on Christianity, not because Christianity is the single
salient inﬂuence on the modern world, but because it is a signiﬁcant one that has
inﬂuenced (indeed it has made possible) the appearance of the industrialised and
individualised world, so much so that a history of the West without Christianity
would be meaningless. All (universal at least) religions provide not only an account
of extramundane beings and our ultimate justiﬁcation, with prescriptive norm, for
social life, but also some account of the nature of humans and how they function.
Though theology is obviously a social representation rather than an internal or
external account of lived experience, it will be evident from the anguished quota-
tions below (particularly those from St. Augustine’s Confessions) that the convert is
constantly trying to align themself with the public dogma, reading and experiencing
life through the new conceptions. We have emphasised conversion because here the
discrepancy between lived experience and theology is especially salient. Initially: for
if successful the convert’s ascribed role becomes his personal achievement.
The idea of the modern self famously provided by Geertz (1983, p. 59)—a
“bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe,
a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgement and action organised into a
distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a
social and natural background”—would be unintelligible in the absence of
Christianity in which its sources may be located. A theology tells us what a
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person is, how people diﬀer, how they act and are motivated, a theory of uniform-
ity and diﬀerence; it oﬀers a schema for the natural and ultrahuman worlds, for
agency, and for inﬂuence; how appetites, emotions and cognitions arise, what they
signify; and a schema of our ultimate destination as beings. Every theology involves
its practical, everyday psychology of human life. We are not arguing that
Christianity contains in embryo everything that we might characterise as “mod-
ern.” (Indeed, in the case under consideration, the onset of Christianity seems to
have led to a temporary shift towards demonic explanations of what might other-
wise be seen as illness.7) Nor that the original appearance of Christianity in a pagan
world had exactly the same eﬀects for a psychology as 20th-century missionisation;
but that the secular modern world has involved certain psychological conventions
of thinking which were strongly fortiﬁed by Christianity, as Marcel Mauss argued
in 1938/1979.
Sass (2004), following the work of the phenomenologist Wolfgang
Blankenburg, proposes that psychological hyper-reﬂexivity is signiﬁcant in schizo-
phrenia: reﬂective self-consciousness and other patterns in which the individual
comes to focus on itself and on features of its own functioning, associated with a
loss of the usual taken-for-granted experience of the local world (what, following
Blankenburg, he terms a “loss of self evidence,” [2004, pp. 305–307], akin to the
well known “delusional mood” of schizophrenia in which the environment is no
longer normal for something odd is going on). The initially tacit, including the
processes of personal psychological functioning, now becomes the focus of aware-
ness: “a focused, introspective awareness that derealises sensations by detaching
them from the unnoticed background whilst simultaneously subjecting these sen-
sations to processes of externalisation and reiﬁcation” (Sass, 2004, pp. 312–313).
Aspects of the self are experienced as akin to external objects as the tacit becomes
forced, artiﬁcial and awkward, and to be examined.8 Reﬂecting on this only
further distances the person from any sense of naturalness or capacity for spon-
taneous action, thus exacerbating self-alienation (Sass, 2001). Living with this
destabilising cognitive slippage and the loss of the tacit is made worse, says
Sass,9 by those (modern) societies which encourage the same tendencies, in
which everybody increasingly lives in a less stable external world and is plunged
into idiosyncratic internalised experience, into a set of fragmented pluralistic
alternatives in which the act of choice itself becomes problematic, and in which
the individual self is increasingly restricted in that its processes, indeed it itself
become an object for scrutiny. Sass describes this as “a shift from extraverted
traditional societies in which emotional life, organised through myth and ritual, is
at the center, to the more introverted modern societies in which intellectual
processes are far more dominant” (2001, p. 318), to, as we might say, the triumph
of psychology as the dominant mode of personal being. It is our argument that
this “excessive” reﬂexive self-consciousness in part originated with Christianity
and Christian conversion, and, reinforced by the Reformation and the develop-
ment of popular everyday secular psychology, has grown in the modern era
and is a concomitant of “Westernisation” (modernisation, internalisation) in
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non-Western societies.10 We will now oﬀer six instances as to how Christian
theology might have provided a route to this psychology.11
Scrutiny of the self in the act of conversion
(a) A delocated and omniscient God addressed in an internal
conversation
To forsake other gods is not so diﬃcult when you can move away from them and
their geographical sphere of inﬂuence—if they are gods of place and nation. The
popular gods of later paganism, amoral and deceivable (Origen, 1869, p. 414), were
still to be found in their place of origin, and continued their work in a local trad-
ition, although they could relocate. While Christian universalism was to be char-
acterised by belief, Greek and Roman religion had been orthopraxic, later with an
idea that empirical knowledge of the gods was possible through divination, oracles
or emergent fate: these had been generally orientated to the wellbeing of the col-
lectivity and the gods did not communicate directly with one (Ando, 2008); there
was “no proximate communication” with them (nullo inter se propinquo commu-
nicato) as Apuleius (1908, p. 11) had put it. But gods and humans were in a
reciprocal relationship where the former could be benevolent when men practised
the correct ritual or sacriﬁce: as the younger Pliny lamented, the Christians only
had to burn a bit of incense and all would be well. Roman, like modern African,
sacriﬁce was concerned with warding oﬀ disaster or to achieve practical beneﬁts
(Peel, 2000). Smith (1990) has made a distinction between these “locative cults”
(which were often syncretic, subsuming one local god into another more powerful)
contrasted with the new “utopian cults” such as the Hellenistic mystery religions12
and Christianity which demanded a fundamental change in the individual and
hence something like introspection. And “God is one,” insists the author of the
early Shepherd of Hermas (Anonymous A, 2003): drawing on Judaism, the
Christian God now denied the very existence of other gods (Origen, 1869,
p. 429). Omnipresent, he controlled every bit of the world, not just the area
around his place of origin. (Similarly the Hebrews who migrated from Palestine
to Alexandria in the late Hellenistic period had had to do without a God in his
Temple in Jerusalem; as they had to, more radically, after the destruction of the
Temple and the expulsion of the Jews by Hadrian.) Communication with God was
now not only by a ritual of place but by an obligatory internal personal conver-
sation—prayer. For the 19th-century missionaries, “one of the proofs of the sin-
cerity of our converts. . .. is the habit of prayer which they have acquired” (Peel,
2000, p. 256). This God was universal, omniscient, and omnipresent: “What tor-
ments my heart suﬀered in mental pregnancy, what groans, my God!. . . And
though I did not know it, your ears were there,” says St. Augustine, “You knew
what I endured; no human being knew” (Augustine, 2008, pp. 119–120). There was
no escaping this God for He already knew what you were thinking, but one could
try to plead with Him or placate Him in a silent conversation and he might respond
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personally: “The Lord did not leave us alone in our aﬄiction” says a bereaved
missionary in Yorubaland (Peel, 2000, p. 167). “The sacriﬁces of God are a broken
spirit. . . and to obey is better than to sacriﬁce. God wants our hearts” an African
convert is told (Peel, 2000, p. 185). Missionaries, evangelising the Yoruba in the
19th century, consciously modelled their work on the Acts of the Apostles (Peel,
2000, p. 155): “Her ori [personal deity] is made of cowries and only God who made
them should be worshipped” (Peel, 2000, p. 157), just as St. Clement had stated
that “We were maimed in our understanding, worshiping stones and pieces of
wood. . . all of them made by humans” (Clement, 2003, pp. 165–166); and similarly
Eusebius (Kofsky, 2000, passim). Christianity pushed the pagans into a universal
linear time of redemptive history and away from their cyclical local history (Leach,
1961). Rather than, say, committing a particular crime in society, the Christian was
born in universal sin (which could be redeemed). For the Yoruba, their concern
with a deferral of death was transformed into the promise of eternal life (Peel,
2000)—or damnation.
(b) A private self similarly independent of immediate physical context
yet located in the individual
This new deity could be encountered anywhere—“Wherever two are gathered in
my name” (Mathew 18.20)—for Christianity was universal and individual (“neither
Jew nor Greek. . . bond nor free. . . male or female, for you are all one man in Christ
Jesus” says St. Paul). And ultimate control rested with Him, Creator and Master of
the whole universe, throughout the whole universe. No longer was there any point
in threatening your recalcitrant (Egyptian) idol for not coming up with the goods
(Cumont, 1911/1958, p. 93): as similarly in colonial Africa, at least according to the
missionaries (Peel, 2000). If God was independent of social context and place, then
so was the individual self at least in its conversations with God (as Dilthey argues).
Religious status was no longer signalled by external signs (circumcision), or social
position (the higher stages of the Roman priesthood had been occupied by aspiring
politicians in the course of their career: “The internal status of the oﬃciating
person was a matter of. . . indiﬀerence to the celestial spirits” [Cumont, 1911/
1958, p. 91]). “Now it is not our ﬂesh that we must circumcise, we must crucify
ourselves, exterminate and mortify our unreasonable desires” (John Chrysostom,
1979), “circumcise your heart” says “St. Barnabas” (2003, p. 45) for religion
became internal and private. Like the African or Roman self (Mauss, 1938/
1979), the Jewish self had been embedded in a functioning society, individually
decentred and socially contextualised (Di Vito, 1999); it survived death only
through its bodily descendants: “But Abram cried, what can you give me, seeing
I shall die childless” (Genesis 15.2). To die without issue was extinction in both
religious systems (Madigan & Levenson, 2008). But now an enduring part of the
self, or an associate of it—the soul—had a connection to what might be called body
and consciousness yet had some sort of ill deﬁned association with them. In its
earthly body it was in potential communication with God. Like God it was
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immaterial and immortal. (The associated resurrection of the physical body,
though an essential part of Christian dogma, has played an increasingly less
important part in the Church [cf. Stroumsa, 1990].) For 19th-century pagan
Yoruba who already accepted some idea of a hereafter, each village has its separate
afterlife which had to be fused by the missionaries into a more universal schema
(Peel, 2000, p. 175). If the conversation with God was one to one, then each self-
aware individual had then to make up their own mind on adherence—and thus the
detached observer became the surveyor of the whole world (Dumont, 1985). Sacral
and secular became distinct (separate “functions” as Dumont calls them), further
presaging a split between psychological faculties. The idea of the self/soul as an
autonomous unit facing God became the basis, via the stages Mauss (1938/1979)
brieﬂy outlines, for a political philosophy of individualism (MacFarlane, 1978).
The missionaries in Africa constantly attempted to reach the inside of their con-
verts, but bemoaned that the Yoruba did not seem to have any inward core to the
self (Peel, 2000, Chapter 9). Lienhardt (1985), whilst broadly sympathetic to the
idea of a precolonial African “collectivist” self, maintains that some aspects of
individuality were of course already recognised (“said the king. . . it is only I who
can see the dance of the tortoise: his dance is entirely inside him”—a folktale
quoted in Lienhardt, 1985, p. 143); he agrees that Christian education has devel-
oped this private self as more distinct and more drastic.
(c) Scrutiny of the self
If each separate person was now a potential temple for God (1 Corinthians 3.16),
yet “be you transformed in the renewing of your mind” (Romans 12.2). Everyday
mundane self and experience were suspect and had to be interrogated.
Introspection had been previously recommended by Plotinus (“go into yourself”
[1984: 1.8.9.7-8]), and Augustine (2008, p. 123) recalls that, “By the Platonic books
I was admonished to return into myself.” Not without some struggle for “I did not
wish to observe myself. . . And I looked and was appalled. . . Where shall I go to
escape from myself?” (2008, pp. 44, 60). “Abase thee, abase thee, O my soul!” says
Marcus Aurelius (1906, p. 14) similarly. Immoral acts now become a part of you
rather than something circumscribed and past to be punished by illness or crop
failure: “If we say we have no sin, we are deceiving ourselves” (1 John 1.8).
Christian duty now prescribed for all a rigorous self-examination ever deeper;
one had to reject the compromised past, but in doing that one inevitably doubted
one’s earlier perceptions and memory as having been suspect (though once tacit)
and fundamentally misconceived or false. “Renunciation and despair of it are our
ﬁrst steps in the direction of the truth,” says William James of the evangelical
Victorian (1904/1964, p. 140). “I had become to myself a vast problem and
I questioned my soul” (Augustine, 2008, pp. 57–58). “Le moi est haissable”
observed Pascal (1910). “What is the attitude of our soul towards your neigh-
bour?. . . Examine carefully whether your heart be sincere,” recommends St.
Francis de Sales (1934, pp. 294–295, 296), “[a]fter each point of the examination
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you will ﬁnd yourself to have failed.” And Thomas a` Kempis (1952, p. 196) advises
“Therefore carefully examine your conscience to the best of your ability, cleansing
and purifying it by true contrition and humble confession.” “Depressed in spirit,
felt my own depravity” similarly comments a 19th-century mission diary in Africa
(Peel, 2000). There was a shift from practice to belief (emphasised yet again in the
Reformation with its particular emphasis on self-control [Max Weber]), and thus a
focus on how you could believe, how you knew that you believed, and what it was
to be sure (Needham, 1972). (But there never could be any certainty, as Calvin
notoriously noted.) Early Christianity appears to have been essentially a peasant
protest movement (Horsley, 2005), and such introspection only seems to have come
in after its more immediate political defeat (the leader’s execution) with gentile
Christianity’s shift to a less politically engaged internalisation (compare the early
modern Anabaptists and Quakers). Augustine quotes Galatians (5.17)—“you are
unable to do what you wish”—to emphasise a compartmentalised and conﬂicted
mind in which the elements are set against each other, unknowing, a conﬂict par-
ticularly salient at the period of conversion, and which William James (1904/1964)
makes sense of using the idea of an unconscious. The point of self-examination was
to achieve a new self mastery to conquer what were taken as the more bodily
emotions. St. Colombanus writes in a 7th-century sermon: “Will you not beware
of yourself, wretch, and have no conﬁdence in yourself—you who are ensnared by
yourself, but not set free by yourself” (as cited in Holder, 2000, p. 113). Early
monastic accounts emphasise a constant monitoring of mood and the practical
management of mood, in ﬁghting the demons of anger (Goehring, 2000; Stewart,
2000): “do not let the sun go down on your anger” (Ephesians 4.26). One attempted
such self-mastery away from others in secret (Œnkpaia); similarly good deeds
should be private and hidden (Mathew 6. 1-18). Secular introspective scrutiny in
printed autobiographies (as well as in private letters) can be dated from the mid-
16th century in England, emerging out of the religious confessional literature
(Skura, 2008; Barker 1984; cf. Burckhardt, 1945): “In those days I would wreak
mine anger altogether with pen and ink on paper”; “I. . . thought that to dissemble
with a dissembler was no dissimulation” (c.1569); “as I have changed the inward
aﬀectes of my minde, so I have lured my wanton workes to eﬀectuall labours”
(1590; all three quoted in Skura, 2008).
(d) Everyday sense data is downplayed
If Hebrew salvation had been essentially this worldly, in Daniel 12 (and 1 Enoch
22) we do have some ﬁrmer intimations of a life to come (possibly under
Zoroastrian inﬂuence; Madigan & Levenson, 2008). In Christianity there was
now a clear Platonic separation between the world of everyday experience—
mundane, temporary, and compromised—and the real other world which was
beyond sensory perception. “Nothing that is visible is good” says St. Ignatius
(2003, p. 273). Origen (1872, p. 462) comments that, “All the Christians therefore
have the eye of the mind sharpened, and the eye of sense closed.” Estranged from
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God, we now had to ﬁnd him by estranging ourselves from our everyday life however
appealing: “Natural good is not simply insuﬃcient in amount and transient, there
lurks a falsity in its very being” describes William James for the Christian (1904/
1964, p. 140). “Do not love the world nor the things which are in the world” (1 John
2.15). “Such [social] amusements,” comments Edward Gibbon acerbically (1993,
p. 527), “were rejected with abhorrence, or admitted with the utmost caution, by
the severity of the fathers”: Thomas a` Kempis (1952, pp. 33, 88) recommends that
“Man’s true spiritual progress depends on denial of the [bodily] self. . .. Live a dying
life. . . dead to self.” St. Ignatius comments that, “I no longer desire to live like a
human” (Ignatius, 2003, p. 281). Our current world was impermanent but we had
been redeemed from the sin of Adam through the Incarnation: “Old things have
passed away, all has become new” says a 19th-century American convert (cited in
James, 1904/1964, p. 200). It is particularly the immediate material aspects of our
current world—food, sex, comfort, anger—that must be downplayed through fast-
ing and self-denial, and engagement with them deprecated (Origen, 1872, p. 460).
This involved the individuals themselves who to an extent become questionable and
unreal. In the 17th century John Bunyan recommended “I must ﬁrst pass a sentence
of death. . . upon everything that can properly be called a thing of this life, even to
reckon myself, my wife, my children, my health, my enjoyment, and all, as dead to
me” (as quoted in James, 1904/1964, p. 156). As the boundaries of possible experi-
ence passed beyond the human lifespan, they became separated from real life,
extending on as a more abstract principle. “[Christians] live in their respective coun-
tries, but only as resident aliens” says the author of the Epistle to Diognetus
(Anonymous B, 2003). What people actually could do in this extended life to
come was left a little vague in experiential terms, but there were continued debates
in the early church as to the activities and nature of the soul: was it purely intellectual
as Origen (1869, pp. 137–142) avowed? Or did Resurrection involve the body as well
as the soul (and the nature of the resurrected body was left open for medieval
debate)? Like other religious systems but perhaps more so, Christianity used logical
paradoxes to emphasise the value of the theorised spiritual over the experienced (the
Folly of the Cross, Death ofDeath andHell’s Destruction, three persons in one, “My
power is made perfect in weakness,” “Credo quia impossibile est”). Taught the mis-
sionary when faced with materially inclined (and presumably mystiﬁed) Africans,
“to die is to gain” (Peel, 2000, p. 166).
(e) Conflicted agency and divine grace
“And he is truly learned who renounces his own will for the will of God” (Thomas
a` Kempis, 1952, p. 32). One had to surrender to God—“break us, melt us, mould
us and ﬁll us with a love of God” as Methodists still appeal to the Holy Spirit
(Heelas, 1981, p. 41); and personal agency was anyway less to be taken for
granted—“I saw that when I acted against my wishes, I was passive rather than
active” (Augustine, 2008, p. 114). Jewish salvation and divine punishment seem to
have been this worldly and collective (Exodus 20.5) although there are hints of
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something more individual in Ezekiel 18.1–4 (Madigan & Levenson, 2008). Rather
than their being natural and unremarked, the individual now had themself to focus
on what it was to decide and act, and why. How did some people make the decision
to reject God? Was it some malign external force yet within oneself (later to become
codiﬁed as the Devil)? If God acted through you, was the active agent God or you, or
somehow both? How could it have gone otherwise? How can I be sure I am saved?
Can I be sure I am sure? Though the fuller development of these questions only
occurred in late medieval theology, we can imagine how they pricked the minds of
the more philosophical or nervous early converts like Augustine. And yet at the same
time one was somehow ﬁnally responsible for one’s actions: Augustine opposed
astrology because it located sin as external to him (Augustine, 2008, bk 4, Chapter
3). And yet the full weight of moral decision was ultimately externalised onto God as
“grace,” his gratuitous and undeserved gift (Pitt-Rivers, 1992): “one of the symbolic
ways of displacing personal responsibility” comments Firth unkindly (1970, p. 25).
God comes toAugustine without his apparent intentions and does something to him:
“I was astonished to ﬁnd that already I loved you” (Augustine, 2008, p. 127); yet
“fearing a precipitate plunge, I kept my heart from giving any assent” (2008, p. 94).
But that ﬁnal plunge is somehow involuntary and up to God’s grace for “the mind
commands the body and is instantly obeyed. The mind commands itself and meets
resistance” (2008, p. 47). In the second century, Origen (1869, p. 416) comments that
some “may have been converted to Christianity, as if against their will.” The con-
fusing idea of “grace” somehow implies that God acts, and yet doesn’t act obviously,
allowing and encouraging something human to happen (and was it inevitable
anyway?). If so, why was it previously blocked by our sin? Presumably this would
lead to confusion over personal and divine agency in the individual: Augustine for
instance is constantly uncertain as to whether God or he is the active agent of a
decision or action. We might assume that for the average convert, this would have
been guided and made easier by the clergy, but the internalised God/self/soul/mind
relations continued to be ambiguous:
So I was in conﬂict with myself and was dissociated from myself. The dissociation
came against my will; this was not a manifestation of an alien mind but the punish-
ment suﬀered in my own mind . . . And so it was ‘not I’ that brought this about. (2008,
pp. 148–149)
Augustine’s conversion does not seem to have resolved these experiential issues, but
rather that they passed into relative insigniﬁcance when he surrendered, took shel-
ter in God, and then passed the credit for all his new now approved actions and
thoughts onto God’s grace.
(f) Decomposition and conflict of the self in conversion
Conversion (followed by exorcism and baptism) was a total transformation which
entailed the introduction of a split in the self which was ideally resolved through
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God’s grace. You could be a Roman pagan, and a Neo-Platonist as well as a bit of a
Manichee as was Augustine in a sort of “add on” process (or consider Apuleius’
Lucius who collected various diﬀerent pagan initiations), in which maybe you
emphasised bits of one more than the other but you did not have to totally discard
the other. Christianity however demanded a total renunciation of the old: “Unless a
man is born again, he cannot see the kingdom of heaven” (John 3.3). (We are here
assuming a voluntary conversion, not the forcedmass conversions of Saxon England
or Germany, or later of Uganda, but the rationale of any conversion presumed some
volition which all successful converts placed retrospectively on their past act.)
In conversion, there are two of you recognised and experienced: the older unregen-
erate you which persists in memory (or backsliding) after the conversion, “our old
self” (Romans 6.6), and the new self anticipated or imagined before conversion,
whether to be then welcomed or not. In the 17th century, Sir Thomas Browne,
speculating on salvation, similarly comments “There is another man within me”
(Browne, n.d., p. 110). Pascal: “So man is always divided and opposed to himself”
(Pascal, 1910, p. 190). “God grant me chastity and continence but not yet” the
vacillating Augustine complains (2008, p. 148). His dilemma ended in his ﬁnal con-
version when he found an injunction from God (Romans 13: 13–14) to give up the
erotic life: but God’s agency and grace not Augustine’s. At the actual moment of
conversion you are in two minds (“the divided self” as William James [1904/1964,
Chapter 8] called it13), at which point the operations of the other self may for a
moment become more salient and problematic, and have to be momentarily con-
sidered for you are then that other self. “The winds blow ﬁrst one way, then the
other, pushing my heart to and fro” (Augustine, 2008, p. 106). There is a dialogue
between the two selves: “Why then are you perversely following the teaching of your
ﬂesh?” he asks himself, and admonishes “Do not be vain my soul” (2008, pp. 62, 63).
“Because we are of two minds. . . we do not realise that we are doing evil” says
St. Clement (2003, p. 197). For Augustine the two selves were the older unregenerate
self, dominated by the sensual appetites, opposed to the new spiritual self (“This
weight was my sexual habit”: 2008, p. 137); and he ﬁnally rejected his philosophical
background because it could not deal with this sort of conﬂict (2008, p. 131). The
actual moment of passing over to the new self was more or less involuntary (see
section Conﬂicted Agency and Divine Grace) and might be sudden (Origen, 1872,
p. 148). At the end, although the conﬂict had been real, acceptance of Christianity
will mean there should be no residual doubts: “the alternative for them will be to be
converted to the true view and not to deny that in the process of deliberation a single
soul is wavering between diﬀerent views” (Augustine, 2008, p. 149). Through becom-
ing a Christian, recognition of God’s Incarnation in Jesus cut short his unavailing
quest for perfect Platonic forms (Stroumsa, 1990).14
Conclusion: A psychology of self awareness
Putting these six inﬂuences of Christianity together, we have an implicit and experi-
enced psychology of detachment from immediate embodied experience in the world,
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with an emphasis on scrutinising and questioning the convoluted workings of a
hidden and immaterial self, seen as distinct from other similar selves and from the
natural world, now with private communication with an omniscient presence who
already knows one’s thoughts and emotions, and with ambiguous agency for per-
sonal actions and experience in the world which are no longer to be taken as tacit and
unproblematic: all of which came to the fore in the process of conversion in which
one has to disassemble one self and create another by carefully bringing one’s deci-
sions to conscious awareness yet attributing the ﬁnal shift externally to the omnis-
cient grace. This involved identiﬁcation and scrutiny both of the processes of
memory and cognition, and of the relations between self and outside world, and
between new entities (God, soul) which had a close relation with the self, in a way
that was hardly necessary for the pagan. Indeed with the growth of the idea of heresy,
to correctly align such personal cognitions with the dominant procedures became an
issue of vital importance. Drawing on Hebrew religion (for instances a, b and e) and
on theHellenistic mystery religions and on Stoicism andNeo-Platonism (instances a,
b, c and d),15 this new view could picture a more explicit hierarchy of deity, the moral
soul, through the cognitive mind to animal impulses, which might all act in concert
or, more usually, be in conﬂict.16 We ﬁnd this psychological schema in Augustine:
“I turned then to examine the nature of mind,” he says in a review of his conversion,
“vicious acts only occur if obsession has captured themind’s aﬀective part which is at
the root of the impulse to carnal pleasures” (Augustine, 2008, pp. 67–68). We are
assuming that all of this gradually percolated down through theological texts and
clerical training, to the sermons and homilies preached to the ordinary populace.
And thus to the way they would understand and experience themselves. With liter-
acy, even words and ideas became separate from the speaking individual and main-
tained an independent existence.
Unlike Greek philosophy, Christianity galvanises everybody. St. Gregory of
Nyssa comments that,
Every corner of the city is thronged with men arguing on incomprehensible subjects.
Ask a man how many obols a thing costs, and he dogmatises on generated and ungen-
erated essence. Inquire what is the price of bread and you are answered the Father is
greater than the Son, the Son is subordinate to the Father. Ask about your bath and you
are told the Son was created out of nothing. (Kellett, 1933/1962, p. 216)
Tertullian and Origen note that theology was as accessible to a workman as to a
philosopher (e.g., Origen, 1872, pp. 156, 467).
The central issue in all of this seems to be the emphasis on a continued scrutiny
of personal actions and inclinations amidst a multitude of alternatives, and on the
downplaying of the everyday physical world, and on the problematisation
of agency: in all, a new self awareness and self reference, a shifting of the
centre of gravity of consciousness into the individual human being. Many
habitual aspects of ourselves, and these we can presume are already enhanced in
proto-schizophrenia—our bodily functioning, “chance” thoughts, sensations,
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impulses, and memories—can be attributed to some source external to the experi-
encing self (to physiology, memory, dreams, genes, passions, habits). We cannot
however now attribute agency to them. As agency is withdrawn from the natural
world, from others, from animals, plants, stars, and spirits, our individual agency
appears enhanced and yet there remains the uneasy balance between the “is it me?”
and the “is it something external?”17
Many external causes, spirits, and stars, not only no longer have agency but are
no longer validated by our society, so any personal explanations of an external
locus of control become increasingly idiosyncratic and divorced from our common
social life (Tausk, 1919/1948).18 If the passage from proto-schizophrenia to schizo-
phrenia is thus perhaps intelligible in social terms, does this oﬀer any clues to the
nature of proto-schizophrenia itself? If the attribution of agency is a general human
characteristic, and is integral to both religion and psychosis (Dein & Littlewood,
2011), then this might suggest that both the proto-symptoms and their transform-
ation into schizophrenia are concerned with this attribution, the transformation
being related to the indigenous psychology we have considered here. This type of
estrangement from experience (later reinforced by a number of secular and reli-
gious developments)19 ﬁts well with Sass’ criteria for the reﬂexive self-consciousness
that has perhaps propelled us into schizophrenia.
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Notes
1. In common modules for agent hyperidentification and theory of mind.
2. For instances of nonaffective delusions as Tudor melancholia see Littlewood (2009).
3. Possibly inherited from his insane French grandfather, Charles VI, on whom see
B. Clarke (1975).
4. Insanity was twice as common in England as in Piedmont or Savoy (B. Clarke, 1975).
5. An obvious objection to our procedure, beyond what threatens to be an unfashionable
unitary model, is that we cannot readily conflate recent cultural changes and the histor-
ical as a unitary phenomenon in what may recall a 19th-century evolutionist schema:
recent small scale communities are not our ancestors and have changed in time just as
have European societies. Nevertheless we would maintain that they have shared some
common psychological features in the same way that, say, parliamentary democracy and
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feminist individualism have been a product both of Western historical development as
well as of contemporary low income countries. This paper is not an essay in evolution-
ary inevitability but in social contingency.
6. It is obviously clumsy to keep talking of proto-symptoms and proto-voices, instead of
symptoms and voices, but we need to bear in mind that a phenomenological description
of the early stage is necessarily opaque and the “proto-” prefix reminds us that this will
emerge only finally as the experienced symptom whether this takes a classically schizo-
phrenic pattern or not.
7. Like elf shot in Anglo-Saxon England (B. Clarke, 1975).
8. Blankenburg had not suggested that this “loss of self-evidence” was temporally prior or
causal in schizophrenia: his approach was purely phenomenological.
9. Who had previously published a comprehensive work on parallels between modern
reflexive self-consciousness and insanity (Sass, 1992).
10. “Westernisation” and “modernisation” are hardly unproblematic terms: we are using
them here for a shorthand for relatively increased material resources, industrialisation,
urbanisation, literacy, the absence of prescriptive marriage patterns, individualisation
and (more recently) lower fertility and mortality rates, a later age of marriage, the
development of nationalism, and a more immediate relationship with the world eco-
nomic and cultural system (Littlewood, 2002, p. 86).
11. There are large problems of method with the sort of schema we have offered here: a
conflation of the historical and the cultural, and of course a drastic summarisation of an
enormous field; a simplification of a complex theology across a vast chronological gap
between early Christianity and more recent missionisation, assuming the same things
mattered in the same way to diverse peoples; with an emphasis on English material
(no Petrarch or Luther, or indeed possible Indian or Chinese parallels), and a detaching
of local theorisations from their immediate social context. Nor are we looking at the
spread of “Christian psychology” beyond Christianised countries through industrialisa-
tion and individualisation. We have ignored the specific contributions of colonialism
and capitalism, the later trajectory of the self from Descartes to Kant and beyond, and
the problem of reconciling a world of top–down essences with that of bottom–up experi-
ence. There is hardly an example or interpretation here which could not be qualified.
12. The seeds of gentile Christianity were located in these religions, as they were in later
Greek philosophy and in the Israelite religion. Some of our “Christian” changes are
presaged or facilitated by the Stoics and Neo-Platonists: reading Plotinus, Marcus
Aurelius, Augustine—or even Julian (who accepted the idea of a supreme God and
an individual soul; Burr, 2000)—shows us how much late paganism anticipated or par-
alleled Christianity: the single omniscient deity, the progress of the soul, the universality
of individual moral obligations. “God is, and cares for us and ours,” and one “must dig
within thee” recommends Marcus Aurelius (1906, pp. 16, 94). And similarly the indig-
nant Yoruba of the Ibadan Empire maintained to the quizzical missionaries that they
already recognised a supreme power above the gods (Peel, 2000, pp. 116–122). The
choice of roles offered in Greek tragedy (Antigone) pointed the way to something
approximating to a self-contained self: Momigliano (1971) argues the Hellenistic
period had biographies and thus a notion of the individual. The religion of the
Hebrews showed some of the psychologisation of Christianity in the emphasis on per-
sonal sin in the Book of Enoch and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, let alone
the Jewish scriptures’ emphasis on an omniscient deity and the possibility of a life
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beyond the material (Madigan & Levenson, 2008). It would be unwise to speculate on
the religious psychology of the Judaeo-Greek cults of Alexandria but we might presume
something interesting here.
13. Later a common idiom for the schizophrenic self—e.g., R. D. Laing.
14. Conversion from paganism to Christianity of course has not always taken such a drastic
and psychological form, and might be motivated by economic self-interest and local
loyalties, whilst still accompanied by troubling dreams or illness (for a modern mission-
ary instance, see Firth, 1973, pp. 325–326).
15. As Bertrand Russell put it, the philosophy of later antiquity had been a gradual process
of increasing subjectivity. Augustine is of course an instance where both family back-
ground and Hellenistic philosophy pushed him into a Christian direction. His rather
abstract Platonic divinity gradually developed personalistic characters under the influ-
ence of his Christian friends and mother: God now had a particular interest in him.
16. As in Aquinas. A more formal instance of something like this is found in the triven-
tricular psychology of the medieval and Renaissance periods—sensation, reason, and
memory—though this is more Galenic than Christian. See however the divine projection
on to this in Robert Fludd’s interesting diagram of 1619 (E. Clarke & Dewhurst,
1972, p. 38).
17. In a neuro-philosophical paper, Kircher and Leube (2003) propose that our first level of
consciousness (prereflexive consciousness) comprises such primary experiences which
are tacit and “transparent” in that while the brain constructs our reality the mechanism
of this construction is not represented in it; thus resulting in naı¨ve realism—the assump-
tion that the content of consciousness has a direct contact to the immediate environ-
ment. If we then reflect on primary experiences, the content enters introspective
consciousness (level two). Primary self-experiences include self-agency (as well as self-
coherence, self-affectivity, and autobiographical memory)—the sense that one is the
author of one’s actions. Life requires a balance between anticipated action
planning and control, and proprioceptive feedback: failure leads to incorrect attribution
of events to the self, as in schizophrenia where self-monitoring fails. We would speculate
that excessive introspective self-consciousness leading to an objectification of experience
in level two, with neglect of proprioception leading to a failure in maintaining this
balance.
18. Lienhardt (1961, p. 149) describes how pagan Dinkas’ everyday emotions and memories
were not experienced as subjective but as put into the person through other people and
events in the environment; a memory is something external still acting on one (Kircher &
Leube’s naı¨ve realism, see Note 17). The dismantling of such a psychology makes
“thought insertion” and “made affects” more problematic and abnormal, no longer
shared by one’s fellows.
19. A process of psychologisation and abstraction continued by of course Islam in an
approximately parallel development (not to mention the Reformation which did much
to enhance an inner directed awareness) but also through the more secular aspects of
literacy, clock time, printing, the diary and the autobiography, double-entry bookkeep-
ing, monetarisation and credit, the market, interest, industrialisation, and communica-
tion technology, all of which have led to a gradual “disembedding” (Giddens, 1990)
from our pagan Being in the World. All societies have some monitoring of thought and
action: what is new is a “reflection upon the nature of reflection itself” (Giddens,
1990, p. 39).
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